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1  INTRODUCTION
This article explores the nature of legal discourse about equality, in partic-
ular homosexual equality, and illustrates how this discourse has traversed 
through sites that may be labelled condemnation, compassion, condonation 
and celebration.1 Much of the discussion focuses on the progress that has 
been made to bring same-sex relationships into the realm of legal regulation. 
In South Africa, legal discourse about equality for gays and lesbians at the 
first three sites has been largely successful and contention remains at the site 
of celebration.
The paths to freedom for gay men, lesbians and transsexuals have both 
intersected and diverged at different times as each of them have pursued their 
own interests through legal challenges. This has produced curious counter-
points, in which transsexuals first had a civil identity2 while gay sexual ex-
pression was criminalised.3 The issues of the gay male community were not 
necessarily those of the lesbian community. After all, lesbianism had never 
been illegal in South Africa. Then, when transsexuals lost their civil status,4 
gay sexual expression was decriminalised.5 Transsexuals once again regained 
legal recognition6 while gays and lesbians pursued the goal of equal treatment 
of their relationships in almost everything up to the recognition of same-sex 
1 I adopt Bruce Mac Dougall’s categories here to illustrate the emerging South African constitutional 
jurisprudence around these sites. See: ‘The Celebration of Same-Sex Marriage’ Ottawa LR (2000-
2001) Vol. 32:2 235. In so doing, I confine myself to legal discourse and legal results, occurring 
mostly at the levels of the courts. Admittedly, this is a limited aspect of the social reality for gays and 
lesbians, but it is a significant aspect. Although the use of the word ‘compassion’ might appear pa-
tronising, it is intended in the present context to signify a new consciousness and empathy towards 
same-sex relationships.
2 See Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Act 81 of 1963 (as amended in 1974) which permitted 
persons who had undergone a sex-change operation to register their new sex on their birth entry.
3 Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 s20A
4 In 1992 the Births and Deaths Registration Act was promulgated which omitted the provision per-
mitting alteration of a change of sex on the register of births.
5 In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC)
6 Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 49 of 2003. From 1993 until 2004 when the Act 
came into operation, there was no provision in the law for persons who had undergone sexual reas-
signment surgery to change their sex description to reflect their new sex.
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marriage. Now, at a point when government has passed the Civil Union Act7 
to provide for the legal recognition of civil partnerships for same-sex couples, 
there remains a tide of opposition to it. 
The article will situate the discourse on sexual orientation within the larger 
process of achieving equality for gays and lesbians. First, I examine the legal 
position of gays, lesbians and transsexuals in the pre-constitutional era to 
identify the ‘unreformed’ position. Second, I discuss how the discourse about 
equality and dignity rights for gays and lesbians in South Africa, particularly 
at the level of litigation, has moved from condemnation to the site of com-
passion and condonation. Lesbians and gays have demanded the rights to 
form legally protected families, to receive benefits equal to their heterosexual 
counterparts, and, more recently, they have demanded the right to marry. 
Such demands have been given expression in a number of cases, leading 
to far-reaching judgments affirming that the equality and non-discrimination 
guarantees in the South African Constitution clearly require treating gays 
and lesbians as full citizens with the full enjoyment of rights enjoyed by all 
citizens. In addition, there has been a growing legislative trend of providing 
benefits to non-spousal (especially same-sex) partners.
I argue that the South African constitutional jurisprudence, although ac-
knowledging that family forms have changed, continues to consider the mar-
ried heterosexual couple as the threshold according to which same-sex re-
lationships are recognised. Implicit in these judgments is the conception of 
the family as an entity which is built around a core unit, the married couple. 
This heterosexual unit continues to be considered as presumptively appropri-
ate and it retains viability as the essential family connection. ‘In fact, argu-
ments that other sexual affiliations, such as same-sex relationships, deserve 
the same privileges afforded to marriage, far from challenging the privileged 
status of marriage, reinforce it by inscribing onto it the attributes of normalcy, 
desirability and privilege’.8 
Finally, I ask whether the establishment of a civil union for gays and lesbi-
ans constitutes true celebration and, hence, full equality.
2   THE ‘UNREFORMED POSITION’ – THE POSITION 
BEFORE 1994
‘Issues of sexuality have generally been unproblematic because for a good 
part of our history, we have understood them on the basis of “natural” bio-
logical processes of human development’.9 Commentaries on the develop-
ment of sexuality have thus revolved around ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ patterns 
of sexual behaviour.10 In addition, the power of the heterosexual norm has 
7 Act 17 of 2006
8 Fineman M ‘Masking dependency: The political role of family rhetoric’ (1995) Virginia LR 2181, 
2198
9 Gelsthorpe L ‘Introduction: Sexuality repositioned’ in Brooks-Gordon B et al (ed) Sexuality reposi-
tioned 2004 1, 11
10 Ibid.
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been central to the construction of the sexual ‘other’, of homosexuality.11
But in the South African context, the apartheid social and legal system did 
not protect minority sexual inclinations, that is, sexual preferences of gays, 
lesbians and transsexuals. Because their sexual orientation differed from the 
norm, gays, lesbians and transsexuals were condemned, excluded and even 
punished by the law in the criminal, civil and family law spheres. 
Homosexual conduct formed the basis of a variety of criminal offences. The 
early Roman criminal law expressly prohibited ‘unnatural practices’ between 
men.12 In the Roman-Dutch common law a large number of sexual acts be-
tween adults, whether between men or between a man and a woman, were 
criminal, if not directed towards procreation.13 But criminalisation of homo-
sexual sodomy was probably the most prominent manifestation of the law’s 
approach to condemnation of homosexuality. Another was the category of 
‘unnatural offences’ often used to punish homosexual conduct which did not 
involve sodomy.14 In S v V15 the court held that mutual masturbation between 
two men is criminal as an ‘unnatural offence’. 
While lesbian sexual activity did not attract the same criminal status as 
male homosexual conduct, in 1988 Parliament extended the existing prohibi-
tion on ‘immoral or indecent’ acts between men and boys under 1916 to those 
between women and girls under 19.17
Moreover, the statutory provision contained in section 20A of the Sexual 
Offences Act18 made criminal any ‘male person who committed with another 
male person at a party any act which was calculated to stimulate sexual pas-
sion or to give sexual gratification. In the National Coalition case19 it was said 
that in the case of male homosexuality ‘the perceived deviance is punished 
simply because it is deviant. It is repressed for its perceived symbolism rather 
than because of its proven harm’.20 According to Cameron,21 the criminal pro-
hibitions of sex between men, as well as the differential age of consent for 
gay men and women have had a severely negative effect on the lives of these 
people. He points to the widespread disapproval and revulsion that judges 
11 Weeks J ‘The rights and wrongs of sexuality’ in Sexuality repositioned (fn 9 above) 19, 22. Some 
states in the US, for example, outlawed oral sex because it was seen as unnatural.
12 On the pre 1994 position of gays and lesbians, see Cameron E ‘Sexual orientation and the Constitu-
tion: A test case for human rights’ (1993) SALJ Vol. 110 450, 453.
13  Ibid. See further R v Gough and Narroway 1926 CPD 159, 161.
14 PMA Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure II: Common-Law Crimes 2 ed (1982) by JRL 
Milton (revised reprint 1990) 267
15 1967 (2) SA 17 (E) at 18C–D
16 See (fn 3 above) s 14 (1) (b).
17 Ibid s 14 (3) (b), as substituted by s 5 of the Immorality Amendment Act 2 of 1988
18 See (fn 16 above). See S v H 1995 (1) SA 120 (C) where the accused who engaged in a voluntary 
sexual relationship with another man was convicted of the offence of sodomy and sentenced to 
twelve months imprisonment wholly suspended. On review, however, the sentence was altered to 
one of a caution and discharge. See also S v Kampher 1997 (4) SA 460 (C) where the constitutional-
ity of the crime was questioned. The prohibition was only declared unconstitutional and invalid in 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). See further 
part 3 on the discussion of this case. 
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid para 108 (per Sachs J).
21 See (fn 12 above) 455.
SAME-SEX COUPLES
0664 Law Democracy and Developme21   21 12/3/07   1:29:37 PM
22
in the past displayed towards gays which took the form of regarding homo-
sexual conduct as immoral and depraved.22 It is no surprise, therefore, that 
homosexual domestic relationships have been explicitly excluded from the 
ambit of family law regulation, employment and insurance benefits.
The exclusive common law definition of marriage as the ‘voluntary union 
for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others …’23 domi-
nated the legal and moral climate pre-dating the interim Constitution. South 
African courts were challenged from time to time to reconsider the nature 
of marriage. Some of these challenges related to the monogamous aspect of 
marriage which was considered to be inconsistent with different cultural and 
religious practices.24 Other issues, relating to the heterosexual aspect of mar-
riage, focused on the rule that persons of the same sex were not permitted to 
marry each other. This rule arises in a related context, namely, the marriage of 
a transsexual who has undergone sexual reassignment surgery (a sex-change 
operation).
Although human sexual orientation and gender identification represent dis-
tinct phenomena, they are intricately intertwined in medical theory and so-
cial consequence and share many common elements, including social stigma 
and perceptions of disability and disadvantage. These parallel elements have 
resulted in curious counterpoints in South African legislative developments 
in the sphere of sexual reassignment surgery and the legal effects thereof. 
22 Ibid 457, (fn 55 and 56 below). Cameron makes reference to numerous cases (R v Gough and 
Narroway 1926 CPD 159 at 163; R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385 at 387; R v Baxter & Another 1928 AD 
430 at 431; Baptie v S 1963 (1) PH H96 (N); S v M 1990 (2) SACR 509 (E) 514b–c and S v K 1973 
(1) SA 87 (RA) at 90C–D) demonstrating the prevailing attitudes of discrimination and ridicule on 
homosexuality. He lists various factors (at 456–461) that have contributed to gays and lesbians be-
ing in a uniquely vulnerable position as far as legal protection is concerned: (a) Disapproval and 
disgust: he compares social attitudes towards racism, sexism and homophobia and concludes that 
it has become widely acknowledged that racism and sexism are irrational and unacceptable, unlike 
homophobia which still triggers expressions of social and moralistic revulsion; (b) Minority: unlike 
other disadvantaged groups, such as women and blacks, gays and lesbians are, by definition, a 
minority; (c) Deviance: stemming from their minority, gays and lesbians are necessarily deviant in 
that their sexual orientation differs from the norm; (d) Invisibility or non-obviousness: unlike race 
and gender the fact that it is not possible to determine a person’s sexual orientation by observation 
has led to the assertion that there is no ‘defining characteristic’ of homosexuality. Cameron argues 
that there is in fact a defining characteristic erotic attraction to the same sex but it is not discernible 
or externally visible in the same way that race and gender usually are. According to him, invisibility 
in this way itself leads to vulnerability to the effects of stigma and discrimination; (e) Choice and im-
mutability: invisibility encourages the belief that there is an element of choice in sexual orientation 
which has led to the rejection of gays and lesbians. Cameron points to varied literature indicating 
that sexual orientation is generally immutable and may be the product of physiological or genetic 
factors. He submits that it is wrong to suggest that the law should protect lifestyles only where they 
involve no element of choice; (f) Sex and sexuality: the distinctiveness of gays and lesbians lies in 
their sexuality and there is still a great deal of embarrassment surrounding homosexuality.
23 Formulated in the well-known English case of Hyde v Hyde and Woodman see (1866) LR 1 P&D. 
24 Although not directly relevant to the present context, such challenges paved the way for a change 
in public policy on the exclusive nature of the marriage relationship. As far as customary marriages 
are concerned, they were not recognised as valid marriages until the coming into operation of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. The most striking feature of both customary 
and religious marriages is the polygynous nature thereof whereby the husband is permitted to take 
more than one wife. With respect to Muslim religious marriages, the position of the courts, as set out 
in Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302, confirmed in Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 
1006 (A) was that these marriages were contra bonos mores and hence invalid because they permit-
ted polygamy. 
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The legislature, in an attempt to keep abreast with medical developments 
permitting sex change operations, in 1974 amended the Births, Marriages 
and Deaths Registration Act25 by inserting section 7B into the Act. This sec-
tion permitted the alteration, in the birth register, of the description of the sex 
of a person who had undergone a change of sex. This Act was replaced by 
the Births and Deaths Registration Act26 of 1992, and section 7B disappeared. 
However, even while section 7B was still in force, it had no effect on the mar-
riage of a person who had undergone sexual reassignment surgery.
In W v W27 the court refused to entertain a divorce action where one of 
the parties to the marriage was a transsexual. Following the English case of 
Corbett v Corbett28, the court held that a person who had undergone a sex-
change operation did not change her biological sex, and could not, therefore, 
marry someone of her original sex (irrespective of her physical appearance or 
gender role in society)29. Similarly, in Simms v Simms30, where the husband 
sought to have his marriage annulled on the ground that his wife, who had 
undergone sexual reassignment surgery prior to the marriage, was at all times 
male, the court declared the marriage null and void. Then, in 1993, section 
33 was inserted into the Act to once again provide for post-operative trans-
sexuals to change their sex description on their birth registers; however, this 
provision had a very limited application.31 
It is noteworthy that during this time, when the Interim Constitution was 
already drafted, one could have challenged the law’s refusal to recognise that 
sexual reassignment surgery brings about a change of sex on the argument 
that sexual reassignment relates to sexual orientation and that denial of legal 
recognition of a change of sex therefore constitutes unfair discrimination on 
the ground of sexual orientation.
‘An alternative constitutional argument which does not challenge, but rather relies on, the 
law’s refusal to recognise that sexual reassignment brings about a change of sex, is that 
if the prohibition of unfair discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation affords ho-
mosexual couples the right to marry,32 it, by necessary implication, also permits a person 
who has undergone a sex change to marry someone of his or her former sex because such 
a marriage would also be between persons of the same sex.’33
The injustice caused by the law’s refusal to attach consequences to sexual 
reassignment surgery was rectified when the Alteration of Sex Description 
 
25 Act 81 of 1963
26 Act 51 of 1992
27 1976 (2) SA 308 (W)
28 [1971] P 83, [1970] 2 All ER 33
29 (Fn 27 above) at 314
30 1981 (4) SA 186 (D)
31 It was only applicable to those persons who were, at the time of promulgation of the amendment, 
undergoing a sex change operation i.e. its application was limited only to persons who had either 
begun or were in the process of the operation; it did not apply after 1993. This meant that from 1993 
until 2004 when the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act came into operation, there was 
no provision in the law for post-operative transsexuals to change their sex description on their birth 
registers. They remained members of their original sex.
32 See further part 4 on the present position regarding marriage rights of same-sex couples.
33 See Boberg’s Law of persons and the family 2 ed (1999) 215.
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and Sex Status Act34 came into operation in 2004. In terms of this Act, any 
person who has undergone sexual reassignment surgery may apply to the 
Director-General of Home Affairs for the alteration of the sex description 
which appears in the register of births. Once the person’s sex description has 
been so altered on the birth register, he or she is deemed for all purposes to 
be a member of his or her new sex. It follows from this that such a person 
will now be entitled to enter into a valid marriage with a person of his or her 
former sex. 
Because marriage between persons of the same-sex was completely forbid-
den, it followed that all the benefits and legal advantages that followed from 
the marital status were also beyond the reach of homosexual couples. The 
following are some of those benefits and advantages:35
(a) Rights and responsibilities in respect of children reared by a homosexual 
couple were virtually unheard of, given the moral and legal climate pre-dat-
ing the Interim Constitution. Until Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen36 there were no 
reported South African cases in which homosexual parents sought to retain 
custody of or have access to their children. The case concerned a dispute 
about access between a divorced couple where the wife (the non-custodial 
parent) was engaged in a lesbian relationship. In defining the mother’s rights 
to access, the court recognised that her right to live and practise her sexuality 
had to be respected and protected, but held that the children’s best interests 
would not be served by allowing them to be exposed to her sexual relation-
ship with another woman. Her right to access was granted under extremely 
strict conditions. This judgment was handed down before the advent of the 
Interim Constitution. However, when the same family placement was again 
challenged (six years later), in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen37, Bertelsmann J 
criticised the earlier judgment in regard to access to the children as being 
‘constitutionally untenable’ holding that it is in conflict with the equality 
clause in the Constitution to describe a homosexual orientation as abnor-
mal. In his view, there existed no justification to regard a lesbian home as 
less suitable than one in which another sexual orientation prevails. The court 
ordered that the one child (a 17-year-old girl) should stay with her mother 
until the family advocate had fully investigated the circumstances regarding 
her custody and deleted the restrictive conditions applying to the mother’s 
access to her son.
Where homosexuals had not had children by heterosexual intercourse, they 
had no parenting options. Gay and lesbian couples could not adopt children 
jointly38; they could only do so as single individuals.39 Craig Lind40 argues 
34 Act 49 of 2003
35 See generally Singh D ‘The refusal to recognise same-sex marriages-a Pandora’s box of inequali-
ties’(1999) 32 De Jure 29 39–41.
36 1994 (2) SA 325 (W)
37 [2001] 2 All SA 37 (T)
38 Child Care Act 74 of 1983 s 17(a). Only married couples could adopt jointly. In addition, the spouse 
of a parent was permitted to adopt that parent’s child by another person. This effectively excluded 
gays and lesbians from adopting the children of their partners.
39 Ibid s 17(b)
40 Lind C ‘Sexual orientation, family law and the transitional constitution’ (1995) 112 SALJ 481 489
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that while homosexual sexual conduct was illegal, it was unlikely that chil-
dren’s courts would have approved attempts of homosexual persons to adopt 
a child, even singly. Further, he adds that regulations governing foster care41 
were also drafted to favour married (hence heterosexual) foster carers over 
homosexual fostering.42 With respect to parenting by artificial insemination, 
there were likewise substantial obstacles preventing de facto homosexual 
partners from enjoying a legal relationship with their children.43 
(b) Rules of intestate succession clearly exclude gay or lesbian partners from 
their ambit. In the absence of a will, the beneficiaries are, in the first in-
stance, a spouse or descendants, or both. Should there be no spouse or 
descendants, the estate devolves upon either the parent/s or other more 
distant blood relatives.
(c) Institutional insurance schemes, such as group life insurance, did not 
generally cover same-sex partners.
(d) Dependant’s actions for compensation are widely recognised in our law. 
Prior to 1994, same-sex partners were not considered as ‘dependants’ 
for the purposes of compensatory rewards. The Medical Schemes Act44 
defined dependant as ‘spouse’, the Military Pensions Act45 referred to 
‘wife’ (or ‘child’), and the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and 
Diseases Act46 included as a dependant a ‘widow/widower married to an 
employee by civil law, indigenous law or customary law, as well as any 
person with whom the employee was, in the opinion of the commissioner, 
at the time of the accident, living as husband and wife’.
Even after 1994, it was held47 that a stable, long standing homosexual rela-
tionship did not establish a duty of support for the purposes of an action for 
loss of support in terms of the Road Accident Fund Act.48 In addition to the 
statutory exclusions, the common law dependant’s action for loss of support 
arising from the death of a breadwinner was also denied to a surviving part-
ner in a same-sex permanent life partnership.49
(e) Section 25(5) of the Aliens Control Act50 facilitated the immigration of 
spouses to enable them to live with their South African counterparts. The 
benefits of this provision, however, were not available to gay and lesbian 
41 GN R2612 GG 10546 of 12 December 1986, issued under s 60 of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983
42 (Fn 40 above) 489. He refers to the regulation requiring that a person applying to become a foster 
parent must submit his or her name and the name of his or her spouse (my italics) to the commis-
sioner. 
43 Ibid 490 (fn 50-52) and text thereto. See also (fn 103 below) and accompanying text on the provi-
sions of section 5 of the Children’s Status Act 82 of 1987. However, this section was declared uncon-
stitutional in J v Director General, Department of Home Affairs 2003 5 BCLR 463 (CC). 
44 Act 72 of 1967 s 1(a). However, see further on Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 (3) 
SA 312 (T) where a partner in a same-sex life partnership was held to be a dependant for the pur-
poses of the police medical scheme.
45 Act 84 of 1976 s 1(1)
46 Act 130 of 1993 s 1(c)
47 See Du Plessis v Motorvoertuigongelukkefond 2002 (4) SA 596 (T).
48 Act 56 of 1996
49 But see further on Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 (1) SA 359 (SCA) where the court extended 
the common law action for damages for loss of support to a same-sex permanent life partner.
50 Act 96 of 1991
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partners even though they may have been in a relationship for a long 
period of time.51
(f) The Prevention of Family Violence Act52 created a statutory interdict by 
means of which a perpetrator could be prohibited from committing do-
mestic violence. One of the criticisms relating to this act dealt with its 
very limited scope in that it did not extend protection to gay couples. This 
was fortunately rectified in the Domestic Violence Act of 1998.
It is evident that prior to the 1990s, there were virtually no legal rights or 
provisions that could be invoked by lesbians and gay men. The legal situa-
tion in South Africa changed considerably with the coming into effect of non- 
discrimination provisions in section 8 of the Interim Constitution of 1993 and 
section 9 of the final Constitution.53 What follows is a consideration of the 
progress that has been made to bring same-sex relationships into the realms 
of legal regulation.
3   OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE 
STEPS IN THE PROCESS OF LEGAL RECOGNITION OF 
HOMOSEXUALITY: FROM CONDEMNATION TOWARDS 
COMPASSION AND CONDONATION
‘With the introduction of a constitutional democracy in 1994, South Africa entered a new 
era characterised by values, such as respect for the dignity and privacy of all its citizens, 
a principled commitment to equality, recognition of the diversity of different groups in our 
heterogenous society and, last but not least, a particular emphasis on bringing the most 
vulnerable groups in society within the ambit of constitutional protection.’54
South Africa became the first country ever to include sexual orientation in 
its anti-discriminatory provisions.55 Unfair discrimination based on marital 
status is also prohibited. These provisions have led to the legal rights of lesbi-
ans and gay men becoming the subject of considerable judicial, political and 
legislative activity.
Generally speaking, legal issues relating to sexual orientation have arisen 
in two contexts:
•	The prohibition of discrimination, primarily to ensure that individual les-
bians and gay men are not discriminated against; and
•	The recognition of same-sex relationships, and the extension to homosex-
ual partners of the benefits and rights that are accorded to heterosexual 
partners.
Several judicial decisions dealing with legal challenges against allegedly dis-
51 But see National Coalition of gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) 
in which s 25(5) was declared invalid. See also Silver B ‘Till deportation do us part: The extension of 
spousal recognition to same-sex relationships’ (1996) 12 SAJHR 575.
52 Act 133 of 1993 which was subsequently replaced by the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998
53 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, hereinafter referred to as the Constitu-
tion
54 Sloth-Nielsen J and Van Heerden B ‘The constitutional family: Developments in South African fam-
ily law jurisprudence under the 1996 Constitution’ International Journal of Law, Policy and the Fam-
ily August (2003) 121
55 S 9(3) of the Constitution
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criminatory laws have clarified the legal position of lesbians and gay men, 
served as a focus for the ongoing political debate about homosexuality and, in 
some instances, provided a framework for legislative reforms. These reforms 
have evidenced a move away from ‘condemnation’ towards homosexuality 
to ‘compassion and condonation’. The past few years have also featured an 
increasing demand, sanctioned by the highest court in the land, for extending 
the institution of civil marriage to same-sex couples. This demand was met 
in November 2006.
South Africa has been no different from most countries which go through a 
standard sequence of legislative steps recognising homosexuality.56 The first 
steps are taken within the criminal law: permitting homosexual acts between 
male adults and then removing age and other distinctions between same-
sex and opposite-sex sexual activity. The next steps are taken by the civil 
law: prohibiting discrimination in employment, and in the provision of goods, 
housing and other services. The final steps are taken by family law, extending 
laws applicable to heterosexual couples to homosexual couples, recognising 
the parental relationship between homosexual parents and their own, or their 
partners’ children, and finally providing for marriage rights.
The Constitutional Court, acting on the equality clause of the Constitution, 
unanimously overturned ‘sodomy laws’ in the country in National Coalition 
for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice and Others57. In a sweeping 
decision, it held that the common law offence of sodomy and the provisions 
of section 20A of the Sexual Offences Act (the laws criminalising consensual 
homosexual conduct) violated not only the equality right but the protection 
of privacy and dignity. The court reaffirmed its earlier equality jurisprudence58 
which had, by now, embodied a rejection of the notion of ‘formal equality’, 
in favour of a ‘substantive’ understanding of equality. De Vos59, referring to 
paragraph 22 of the judgment, says that substantive equality takes into ac-
count the structural inequalities in our society and endorses the view that the 
experience of subordination lies behind the vision of equality. He continues 
by saying that the right to equality is conceptualised as a right to be different 
from the stated or unstated norm without suffering adverse consequences 
because of such difference.60 
As pointed out earlier, sexual orientation is a listed ground of discrimina-
tion; discrimination is therefore automatically presumed. In addressing the 
unfairness of the discrimination brought about by the law governing sodomy, 
56 See Hale B ‘Homosexual rights’ Child and family law quarterly June (2004) 125 who discusses prog-
ress in English law towards removing discrimination against gay and lesbian people. The steps that 
are followed are taken from the text (read with footnote 1) at 125.
57 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). In this groundbreaking judgment, many of the foundational principles on sexual 
orientation discrimination were laid. 
58 As formulated in Harksen v Lane 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC), and confirmed in Prinsloo v Van der Linde 
& Another 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) and President of the Republic of South Africa & Another v Hugo 
1997(4) SA 1 (CC). This was based on the tiers of enquiry to be traversed to determine whether a 
challenge involving the fundamental right to equality is justified or not. 
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Ackermann J emphasised that ‘it is the impact of the discrimination on the 
complainant or the members of the affected group that is the determining fac-
tor’.61 He continued by saying that the desire for equality is not a striving for 
the elimination of all differences but requires an understanding of ‘the other’ 
in society. Discriminatory prohibitions on sexual relations between men re-
inforce existing societal prejudices and increase the negative effects of such 
prejudices.62 The point has been put with eloquence in a Canadian case:
‘It is easy to say that everyone who is just like ‘us’ is entitled to equality. Everyone finds 
it more difficult to say that those who are ‘different’ from us in some way should have 
the same equality rights that we enjoy. Yet as soon as we say---a group is less deserving 
and unworthy of equal protection and benefit of the law all minorities and all of society 
are demeaned. It is so deceptively simple and so devastatingly injurious to say that those 
who are of a different sexual orientation are less worthy.’63
This theme of equality as including a respect for difference was also endorsed 
by Sachs J who wrote a concurring judgment. He stressed that equality should 
not be confused with uniformity on the contrary, ‘equality means equal con-
cern and respect across difference’.64 He added that the success of the consti-
tutional endeavour will depend on how successfully we are able to reconcile 
sameness and difference. Both Ackermann J and Sachs J affirmed that the law 
governing sodomy violated, not only the right to equality, but also the rights 
to privacy and dignity. Section 14 of the Constitution guarantees to everyone 
the right to privacy. Homosexual relationships are undoubtedly an aspect 
of private life. This long ago enabled the European Court to rule against the 
criminalisation of homosexual acts between consenting adults in private in 
Dudgeon v United Kingdom.65 Ackermann J followed this reasoning in holding 
that the way in which we give expression to our sexuality is at the core of this 
area of private intimacy. If, in expressing our sexuality, we act consensually 
and without harming one another, invasion of that precinct will be a breach 
of our privacy.66 Sachs J correctly highlighted that the act is punished for sym-
bolic reasons rather than because of its proven harm.67 Proof of this is that 
consensual anal penetration of a female is not criminalised. Therefore, it is 
not the act itself that is punished, but the particular persons who perform it. 
The constitutional protection of dignity reinforces the value and worth of all 
individuals as members of society. In the view of Ackermann J the existence 
61 (Fn 57 above}) para 19
62 Ibid paras 22 and 23
63 Vriend v Alberta [1998] 3 LRC 483 518 (per Cory J), quoted in the sodomy judgment at para 22. In 
Canada, although sexual orientation is not expressly included as a prohibited ground of discrimi-
nation, the Supreme Court has held that it is a ground analogous to those listed in s 15(1) of the 
Canadian Charter.
64 (Fn 57 above) para 132
65 (1982) 4 EHRR 149. Sexual activity is, as the court said, ‘a most intimate aspect of private life’. But 
to regard homosexual relationships as a narrow privacy issue is to deny to them the full enjoyment 
which other relationships take for granted. Opposite-sex couples can walk hand in hand or arm in 
arm or even engage in closer intimacies in public; until recently same-sex couples could not.
66 (Fn 57 above) para 32. Interestingly, it was the possibility of harm to both the individual and the so-
ciety as a whole which prevented Justice Mwaikaso in a Botswana Appeal Court in 2003 (see Bojosi 
KN‘An opportunity missed for gay rights in Botswana: Utjiwa Kanane v The State’ SAJHR (2004) 20 
466) from declaring unconstitutional provisions of the Botswana Penal Code penalising unnatural 
acts and indecent practices between males. 
67 Ibid para 108
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of a law which punishes a form of sexual expression for gay men degrades 
and devalues them in our broader society and is therefore an invasion of 
their dignity.68 Taking this further, Sachs J described dignity as the concept 
that links equality and privacy. He distinguished between the use of dignity 
in the context of the equality clause and the protection of the right to dignity 
in terms of section 10; in the former, the focus is on the impact of a measure 
on a historically vulnerable group which is discriminated against because of 
certain personal characteristics – the inequality of treatment both leads to 
and is proved by the indignity. By contrast, section 10 contemplates a much 
wider range of situations, ‘these would be cases of indignity of treatment lead-
ing to inequality, rather than of inequality relating to closely held group char-
acteristics producing indignity’.69 As has been pointed out, both Ackermann 
J and Sachs J made it plain that the dignity right is not to be collapsed into 
the equality right, and stressed that dignity in terms of section 10 has a much 
wider scope than the dignity concept which is used to determine unfairness. 
This perhaps points to the validity of the distinction made by Susie Cowen70 
between dignity as a right and dignity as a value.71 This judgment was the first 
in the sequence of steps to end discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Prohibition of discrimination in employment arrived in the case of Lange-
maat v Minister of Safety and Security72. In this case a lesbian police captain 
sought to have her partner included in her medical aid scheme.73 In finding in 
her favour, the court, per Roux J, held that a dependant is someone who relies 
upon another for maintenance. Taking into account the times and society in 
which we live, Roux J held that he could not ignore the knowledge and ex-
periences of many same-sex couples who have lived together for years. They 
must surely, in his opinion, owe a duty of support to each other. He correctly 
pointed out that ‘the stability and permanence of their relationships is no 
different from that … of married couples … both types of unions are deserv-
ing of respect and protection’.74 He added that it was time that the law began 
according protection to same-sex unions. The effect of the scheme’s rules and 
regulations was to exclude many de facto dependants of members of the po-
lice force. This, in his view, amounted to discrimination against the depend-
ants, as well as members of the police force who would have to find alterna-
68 Ibid para 28
69 Ibid para 124, quoted in Carpenter G ‘The right not to be discriminated against on the ground of 
sexual orientation: National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice’ THRHR 
2002 (65) 50 55
70 ‘Can dignity guide our equality jurisprudence?’ 2001 SAJHR 34
71 Carpenter (fn 69 above) 56
72 1998 (3) SA 312 (T). Although the outcome of this decision was welcomed by many, others were 
critical of the reasons for the judgment: See van der Walt G ‘Gay rights and medical aid schemes 
Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security [1998] 2 All SA 259 (T)’1998 Obiter 193; Louw ‘Lange-
maat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 (3) SA 312 (T): A Gay and Lesbian Victory but a Consti-
tutional Travesty’ 1999 SAJHR 393 and Havenga ‘Same-sex unions, the Bill of Rights and Medical 
Aid Schemes Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 3 SA 312 (T)’1998 THRHR 722. 
73 Which allowed only the legal spouse, widow or widower and the child of a member of the police 
force to be registered as the member’s dependant.
74 (Fn 72 above) 316 G. Note that this statement made in the context of same-sex relationships prob-
ably marked one of the initial breaks with the past traditional conception of family as consisting of 
a married couple. 
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tive means to pay for the medical care of their dependants. He declared the 
position unconstitutional and ordered the chairperson of the police medical 
scheme to reconsider the application for registration of the applicant’s lesbian 
partner as her dependant.
The Medical Schemes Act75 came into operation soon after the judgment. 
In terms of this Act, a medical scheme may not be registered if its rules un-
fairly discriminate against anyone on one or more grounds, including sexual 
orientation.76 Kerry Williams77 argues that there is still scope, however, within 
the Medical Schemes Act for introducing criteria to establish the existence 
of a same-sex partnership before a partner is admitted as a dependant. Un-
like married heterosexuals who, by virtue of their marriage, are automatically 
registered with a medical aid scheme, same-sex partners are treated differ-
ently. She submits that the judgment in Langemaat does not directly prevent 
medical aid schemes generally from creating their own criteria for same-sex 
partnerships.78 There is merit in her submission.
The provisions of the Aliens Control Act79 sparked a number of cases in which 
the meaning of ‘family’ and the right to ‘family life’ arose. The case of National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality & Others v Minister of Home Affairs80 led 
the way. In this first decision addressing the partnership rights of gays and les-
bians, the Constitutional Court overturned the provisions of this Act which re-
stricted immigration benefits (including the right to accord residency to a foreign 
partner) to ‘spouses’ while denying it to same-sex partners.81 The court held that 
this denial reinforced harmful stereotypes of gays and lesbians, invading their 
constitutional right to dignity by conveying a message that same-sex relation-
ships lacked the same validity as heterosexual ones.82 It also held that the denial 
discriminated against gays and lesbians on the grounds of sexual orientation and 
marital status. In the words of Ackermann J,
‘the pre-requisite of marriage before the benefit is available points to that element of 
the discrimination concerned with marital status, while the fact that no such benefit is 
available to gays and lesbians engaged in the only form of conjugal relationship open to 
them in harmony with their sexual orientation represents discrimination on the ground 
of sexual orientation.’83
75 Act 131 of 1998. This Act repealed the Medical Schemes Act 72 of 1967
76 S 24 (2) (e)
77 ‘Legalising same-sex marriage in South Africa’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 32 56
78 Ibid, specifically (fn 122)
79 Act 96of 1991
80 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC). On this case see also Motara ‘Making the Bill of Rights a reality for gay and 
lesbian couples National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs’ (2000) 16 
SAJHR 344; Louw ‘Gay and lesbian partner immigration and the redefining of family National Coali-
tion for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 313; Chetty ‘Sexual 
orientation as a constitutional right National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2000 1 SA 39 (CC)’ 2001 (64) THRHR 657; Carpenter (fn 69 above) 56; and Sloth-
Nielsen and Van Heerden (fn 54 above) 131.
81 S 25(5) of the Act expressly permitted granting exemptions regarding immigration permits to foreign 
spouses and dependant children of permanent South African residents.
82 The court went on to dismiss some of these stereotypes, specifically those relating to children and 
the one based on the fact that same-sex couples cannot procreate. Procreation, as Ackermann J put 
it, is not a defining characteristic of conjugal relationships.
83 (Fn 80 above) para 40
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The court expressed its reluctance to strike down the section in its entirety, 
and instead read in after the word ‘spouse’, the following words: ‘or partner in 
a same-sex partnership’. The deciding factor regarding the unfairness of the 
discrimination was the impact of the discrimination on gay and lesbian part-
nerships. The court accepted that an enquiry into past disadvantage was im-
portant because it revealed the vulnerability of the group. In concluding that 
the impact of section 25(5) was to reinforce harmful stereotypes of gays and 
lesbians, the court, ‘however’ acknowledged that there has been a change in 
societal and legal concepts regarding the family and what it comprises.84 
The attitude of the court regarding the protection of the traditional institu-
tion of marriage deserves mention. An important issue canvassed was the 
relationship between family and marriage, and the extent to which gay and 
lesbian couples can be considered as constituting family. The court conclud-
ed that the values of family life that are protected by section 25(5) are equally 
to be found in same-sex relationships. In short, gays and lesbians are able 
to establish a consortium omnis vitae and are capable of establishing a fam-
ily and benefiting from family life.85 The focus by the court on this aspect of 
consortium sends out a strong message that only those relationships that are 
sufficiently similar to marriage will qualify for recognition. De Vos86 correctly 
points out that the court seems to support a rather narrow conception of 
which intimate relations should qualify for protection, even while it professes 
to endorse a more open-ended view and claims that is broadening access to 
‘the family’. As will be illustrated further, this trend seems to filter through the 
later judgments as well.
In Farr v Mutual and Federal Insurance Company Ltd87 the court held that 
two gay men living together in a domestic relationship constituted a family. A 
motor insurance policy excluded liability by the insurer for bodily injury to ‘a 
member of the policy holder’s family normally resident with him. In interpret-
ing the exclusion clause, the court held that, having regard to the purposes of 
the exclusion clause, namely, to restrict the potential liability of the insurer 
by excluding the category of persons more likely to travel in his motor vehi-
84 See generally Motara (fn 80 above) 348. Louw (fn 80 above) 319, argues further that negative social 
attitudes diminished significantly as a result of the enactment of the equality provision in the interim 
Constitution. In other words, changes in the law, whether legislative or judicial, impact on society. 
By the time of the Sodomy judgment, gay and lesbian stereotyping was on the decrease. Although 
this judgment probably had less direct impact on gays and lesbians, it laid a solid foundation on 
which further developments have been based.
85 (Fn 80 above) para 53. According to the court, to determine which relationships are worthy of pro-
tection, one should first determine the exact nature of family life that is usually protected through 
the common law recognition of marriage and the concept of consortium. The court provided a list 
of factors that might determine whether the intimate relations of same-sex couples are sufficiently 
similar to that of the idealised heterosexual marriage. They serve as guidelines to establish when a 
permanent same-sex partnership exists. 
86 ‘Same-sex sexual desire and the re-imagining of the South African family’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 179 
197
87 2000 (3) SA 684 (C). See also Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) where the 
Constitutional Court recognised that the family is a social institution of vital importance and that 
‘families come in many shapes and sizes’. The court ruled in this case that the right to dignity 
encompasses and protects the rights of individuals to enter into and sustain permanent intimate 
relationships. In other words, the right to family life is protected by the right to dignity.
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cle with the insured, a functional approach (by examining what a family did 
rather than what a family was) had to be adopted. On this approach, the ap-
plicant’s same-sex partner was held to be a member of the applicant’s family 
within the meaning of the exclusion. The consequence of the exclusion, how-
ever, meant that the insurer was not liable to indemnify the applicant for the 
injuries his same-sex life partner sustained. As in the previous decisions, the 
court took into account the degree of permanency and the manner in which 
the partners live together and concluded that it resembled a marriage between 
a husband and wife.88 
The trend towards the recognition of same-sex relationships continued in 
Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa89. In this case, High Court 
judge Kathleen Satchwell successfully challenged provisions of the Judges’ 
Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act90 and the corresponding 
Regulations that prevented her same-sex partner from receiving the equiva-
lent pension and other benefits regarding transport, travelling and subsist-
ence provided to spouses of judges. She argued that the provisions constitut-
ed unfair discrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation. 
Kgomo J, sitting in the High Court,91 agreed that the offending sections of the 
Act and Regulations were unconstitutional and ordered that the words ‘or 
partner in a permanent same-sex life partnership’ be added after the word 
‘spouse’. He relied heavily on the constitutional right to dignity in coming to 
his finding. Sloth-Nielsen and van Heerden92 have observed that when dis-
cussing the parameters which may be utilised to determine who the bona fide 
beneficiaries of the amended dispensation should be, the High Court cited 
and relied upon exactly the same list of factors formulated by the Constitu-
tional Court in the National Coalition case,93 thus opening itself to the same 
criticisms as has been articulated above.
In the Constitutional Court, respondents’ counsel (correctly, in the court’s 
view) accepted that same-sex partners are entitled to found their relation-
ships compatibly with their sexual orientation, and added that the restrictive 
legal meaning of the word ‘spouse’ subjects such relationships to unfair dis-
crimination. Madala J, on behalf of a unanimous court, confirmed the High 
Court order declaring the specific provisions unconstitutional, but empha-
sised that the wording of that order omitted an important requirement of a 
reciprocal duty of support. He said that the discrimination in issue here is 
between spouses and same-sex partners in a permanent life relationship simi-
lar in other respects to marriage (my emphasis). In his view, the equality right 
88 My emphasis. Louw J articulated the position as follows: ‘… while society might not necessarily ap-
prove of homosexual relationships, it does recognise that where such a relationship has a degree of 
permanency and the manner in which the partners live together resembles for all intents and purposes 
a marriage between a husband and wife, they could be considered members of a family as would be a 
husband and wife’. (My emphasis) 
89 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC)
90 Act 88 of 1989. This Act has been replaced in it’s entirety by the Judges’ Remuneration and Condi-
tions of Employment Act 42 of 2001 with effect from 22 November 2001.
91 2001(12) BCLR 1284 (T)
92 (Fn 54 above) 132
93 See para 26 of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs 
and Others (fn 80 above).
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could only be used to protect those same-sex relationships where a recipro-
cal duty of support had been undertaken since the ‘Constitution could not 
impose obligations towards partners where those partners themselves had 
failed to undertake such obligations’.94 The setting of a new standard for the 
evaluation of lasting relationships once again indicates the court’s continued 
drive to align same-sex relationships with marriage in the absence of formal 
recognition.
Goldblatt95 raises some interesting questions regarding the added require-
ment of a duty of support. Firstly, she notes that the circumstances of the 
present case seem similar to those in the Home Affairs case. Both cases in-
volved access to the same privileges afforded to spouses, but resulted in dif-
ferent orders.96 A right to an immigration permit, in her view, is no different 
from a financial benefit (the pension) which both flow from the relationship 
between spouses or same-sex partners. Secondly, the implications of the 
judgment suggest that there must be an agreement between the partners to 
support each other. In the absence of an agreement then, there is no legal 
duty of support that flows from the relationship between the partners. This, 
she concludes, is unfortunate since it offers less legal assistance to same-sex 
partners than to other family members who have traditionally been recog-
nised by our law, such as spouses, and parents and children.97 She correctly 
points out that the ‘Constitutional Court’s emphasis on the acknowledgement 
and protection of new family forms should have led it to conclude that a per-
manent same-sex life partnership creates a legal duty of support in the same 
way that marriage does’.98 And finally, she asks what will same-sex partners 
have to show so as to establish the existence of a duty of support. Proof of a 
permanent life partnership would in most cases entail demonstrating the ex-
istence of a reciprocal duty of support. In this respect, she points out that the 
judgment creates a measure of uncertainty for same-sex partners. However, 
it can be considered generally as a positive step closer to formal recognition 
of same-sex relationships. 
The positive spirit of the ruling in the Satchwell case was echoed in an un-
reported ruling in Muir v Mutual and Federal Pension Fund99. This case arose 
when insurers Mutual and Federal refused to pay the lesbian partner of a 
deceased employee the full benefit arising from the dead woman’s pension. 
Ordinarily, full benefit was payable to dependants, and though Mutual and 
Federal conceded that Muir was a dependant, they only paid her half of the 
pension benefit, while distributing the other half to the dead woman’s other 
family members. In a preliminary hearing, handed down on May 13 2002, 
the Pension Funds Adjudicator indicated that Mutual and Federal had erred 
94 (Fn 89 above) para 24
95 ‘Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC)’ 2003 SAJHR 118 121.
96 In the Home Affairs case, the court merely ordered that the words ‘or partner in a permanent same-
sex life partnership’ be read after the word ‘spouse’ (without the added requirement of a duty of 
support).
97 (Fn 95 above) 122
98 Ibid.
99 In the Tribunal of the Pension Funds Adjudicator Case No: PFA/WE/2932/SM May 13 2002
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in paying Muir only half of the benefit. In its final determination, the Pen-
sion Funds Adjudicator confirmed the interim ruling. This ruling confirms that 
pension law in South Africa is now very clear on the protection of same-sex 
relationships regarding pension.
A further step along the road towards formal recognition of same-sex rela-
tionships was taken in Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Develop-
ment100 where the Constitutional Court, in confirming an order of the High 
Court, declared certain provisions of the Child Care Act101 and the Guardian-
ship Act102 unconstitutional. The applicants, a lesbian couple, jointly wanted 
to adopt two children, but could not do so because only married couples 
could adopt children jointly in terms of the Child Care Act. Consequently, 
the second applicant alone became the children’s adoptive parent. They sub-
sequently challenged the constitutionality of the relevant provisions on the 
ground that their failure to make provision for same-sex life partners as adop-
tive parents violates same-sex life partners’ right to equality and their right 
to dignity, and does not give paramountcy to the best interests of the child. 
The court found that the impugned sections unjustifiably limited the right 
not to be unfairly discriminated against on the ground of sexual orientation, 
and the right to dignity. It further found that the situation that was created by 
only one partner to the same-sex union having a legal relationship with the 
adopted child was manifestly not in the best interests of those children whose 
rights their care givers sought to enforce and protect. The court read words 
into the Acts to bring same-sex life partners within the ambit of the sections. 
The outcome of this decision is that same-sex life partners may jointly adopt 
children. One same-sex life partner may furthermore adopt the other’s child 
without the legal rights and obligations between the parent and the child be-
ing terminated. In both instances, the same-sex life partners are the child’s 
joint guardians after the adoption. The effect of this case is that it not simply 
secures rights of adoption, but also recognises the ‘relationship’ (long-term, 
and committed relationships) of gay and lesbian couples even though the 
judgment does not explicitly ‘legalise’ same-sex relationships. 
Same-sex life partners also received recognition as parents in J v Direc-
tor General, Department of Home Affairs.103 In this case, one of the lesbian 
partners in a permanent life partnership gave birth to twins who had been 
conceived as a result of in vitro fertilisation of the other partner’s ova with 
donor sperm. The women wanted to be registered as the parents of the twins, 
with the birth mother being indicated as their ‘mother’ and her partner as 
their ‘parent’. The department refused to register the children’s birth in this 
manner arguing that because there was no legal marriage none of them could 
claim fatherhood of the twins. The women approached the High Court for 
an order directing the Director-General to do so. They also challenged the 
100 2002 10 BCLR 1006 (CC), 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC)
101 Act 74 of 1983, specifically s 17(a), 17(c) and 20(1)
102 Act 192 of 1993, s 1(2)
103 2003 5 BCLR 463 (CC). See Cronje DSP & J Heaton South African family law 2 ed (2004) 233; Cronje 
& Heaton Casebook on South African Family Law 2 ed (2004) 400
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constitutionality of section 5 of the Children’s Status Act104 which provided 
that children born as a result of artificial insemination are legitimate if the 
birth mother is married, but not if she is single (or a partner in a same-sex 
life partnership). Magid J, in the High Court, ordered the registration of the 
children’s birth reflecting the birth mother as the children’s ‘mother’ and her 
lesbian life partner as the ‘parent’. Further, the claim of the birth mother’s 
lesbian life partner to be recognised as a natural parent and guardian of the 
children was also granted. Finally, the court declared the provisions of sec-
tion 5 of the Children’s Status Act unconstitutional on the basis of ‘marital 
status and probably sexual orientation’. In respect of the children, it found 
that the provisions amounted to discrimination on the listed grounds of social 
origin and birth.
The Constitutional Court confirmed the declaration of unconstitutionality 
on the ground of sexual orientation. It ordered the striking out of the word 
‘married’ and reading in the phrase ‘or permanent same-sex life partner’ in 
several places in the section having the effect of the section being read so as 
to provide the same status to children born from artificial insemination to 
same-sex life partners as to children born to heterosexual married couples. 
Again, the court’s decision, while not explicitly pronouncing on the union, 
implies an interpretation of a constitutional provision that recognises same-
sex equality. But, again, the court’s decision is based on the permanency of a 
life-long partnership. It is ironic that the permanency in this case had much 
to do with the recognition of parenthood, an issue often used against same-
sex couples in debates about marriage.  
In Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund105 the Supreme Court of Appeal extend-
ed the common law dependant’s action to the surviving partner in a same-sex 
permanent life partnership, similar to a marriage, in circumstances where 
the deceased had contractually undertaken a duty of support towards the 
survivor. The appellant and the deceased had lived together continuously for 
approximately eleven years until the deceased was killed in a motor vehicle 
accident. Their relationship was in all respects similar to a marriage. Some 
five years into the relationship, the appellant was medically boarded. From 
then on, the deceased contributed towards the appellant’s financial support 
and undertook to continue doing so for as long as the appellant needed it. 
After the deceased’s death, which was largely attributable to the negligence 
of the driver of a vehicle insured by the Road Accident Fund, the appel-
lant instituted a dependant’s claim for loss of support against the Fund. He 
also sought to recover the deceased’s burial expenses. By consent, the matter 
proceeded to trial only on the issue of whether the appellant’s right to such 
compensation was recognised by law.
The court a quo106 dismissed the appellant’s claim for support on the grounds 
that a stable, longstanding relationship of cohabitation between same-sex 
partners does not give rise to the legally enforceable duty of support neces-
104 Act 82 of 1987
105 2003 11 BCLR 1220 (SCA), 2004 (1) SA 359 (SCA)
106 Du Plessis v Motorvoertuigongelukkefonds 2002 (4) SA 596 (T)
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sary to found such a claim. To hold otherwise, the court held,107 would create 
legal uncertainty and open the floodgates of litigation. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal, however, took a different view. In a unani-
mous judgment delivered by Cloete JA, the court found that the appellant was 
entitled to compensation for the loss of the deceased’s financial support. In 
coming to this conclusion, the court held that to extend the action in this case 
‘would be an incremental step to ensure that the common law accords with 
the dynamic and evolving fabric of our society as reflected in the Constitu-
tion, recent legislation and judicial pronouncements’.108 
This decision represents an important advance towards recognising and 
protecting persons involved in same-sex partnerships in that it developed the 
common law dependant’s action to accord with the realities of modern fam-
ily life and social conditions. In this respect, the decision is to be welcomed. 
At the same time, the court fell short of acknowledging in principle a duty 
of support in all instances of stable same-sex relationships.109 The decision 
was restricted to a relationship which satisfied three specific criteria: (a) the 
deceased and the surviving same-sex partner must have been in a permanent 
life partnership; (b) their relationship must in all respects be similar to a legal 
marriage; and (c) they must have undertaken a contractual duty to support 
each other. 
Steynberg and Mokotong110 submit that the failure of the court to address 
and qualify the word ‘permanent’ results in placing a stricter requirement 
on same-sex couples than what is expected of married couples. It seems too 
narrow an interpretation to state that ‘permanency’ applies mainly in regard 
to the number of years the couple have lived together.111 They add that the 
length of the relationship between same-sex couples should not be the only 
factor that plays a role in the court’s decision whether the relationship was 
‘permanent’. Proper legal interpretation should be given to the word ‘per-
manent’ to embrace other intimate same-sex relationships which might not 
necessarily have lasted over a long continuous period.112
With regard to the relationship being ‘similar in other respects to marriage’, 
it is submitted that for the purposes of the dependant’s action the issue is not 
107 Ibid 598
108 2004 (1) SA 359 (note 105 above) para 37
109 See in this regard Steynberg L & Mokotong M ‘The common law duty of support: Developed and 
extended to include the surviving homosexual partner’ 2005 (68) THRHR 330 331.
110 Ibid 332-334
111 They support their submission by reference to the previous decisions where the courts have also 
preferred a continuous long period before recognising that those relationships were permanent. For 
example, in Langemaat, the court held that ‘parties to a same-sex union, which has existed for years 
in a common home’ owe each other a duty of support; in Satchwell the same-sex partners had been 
living together for about 12 years; in Du Toit the partners were in a longstanding lesbian relationship 
for approximately 13 years and in J v DG, Department of Home Affairs the partners were in a life 
partnership for 8 years. 
112 Steynberg & Mokotong (fn 108 above) 332. They suggest that the degree of commitment the couple 
has shown towards each other, the degree of attachment that exists between them, their intention to 
support each other and (in the context of a similar case as the present what potential the relation-
ship had of becoming ‘permanent’ had it not been for the untimely death of the breadwinner) are 
certainly factors that are material in determining the ‘permanency’ of a relationship.
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whether the parties were in a relationship similar to marriage, as the court 
suggests, but rather whether the type of relationship gave rise to a duty to 
support each other, whether the deceased did in fact support the dependant 
and whether the relationship deserved recognition and protection at common 
law.113 Even the application of the Maintenance Act114 extends to a contrac-
tual duty of support between persons who are not related to each other by 
blood or marriage, or a relationship that is not similar to a conventional mar-
riage (for example, a same-sex relationship).
The third factor of the existence of a contractual duty of support between 
same-sex partners imposed an onerous burden on the surviving partner 
which a surviving heterosexual spouse does not have to prove. The effect of 
this requirement made it very difficult for same-sex partners who did not en-
ter into a written contract to prove a legally enforceable duty of support. For 
these reasons, it is submitted that the criteria in Du Plessis were unjustifiably 
limiting.115 However, with the recognition of civil unions this third critique 
now becomes largely redundant.
The outcomes of the above decisions have addressed some of the concerns 
that lie at the heart of the equality debate surrounding the rights of same-
sex partners. But they have not resolved all of them. Even though there has 
been a shared sense of a movement away from condemnation (based on 
outdated stereotypes) towards compassion and condonation (based on the 
acknowledgement of the principle of difference and the integrity of lesbian 
and gay persons) true celebration in the form of full equality has yet to be 
achieved. Woolman116, in tracing the process of transformation in the equal-
ity jurisprudence on sexual orientation, correctly points out that the earlier 
jurisprudence began by rejecting laws that impaired the ability of same-sex 
partners to live private lives within South Africa. Such changes met with lit-
tle resistance by the state until Satchwell which required public recognition 
of the equality and dignity rights of gays and lesbians. A noticeable change 
began to emerge in the state’s attitude to the recognition of relationships in 
the public context. Woolman117 cites the example of Satchwell where the Con-
stitutional Court had to take the uncomfortable step of invalidating a piece 
of legislation that refused to extend public benefits to the surviving same-sex 
life partner of a judicial officer. 
Even though the early cases emphasised that not only marriage-like same-
sex relationships should be protected, but also other non-traditional forms 
of relationships, the later judgments make it clear that the extension of fam-
113 Ibid 333. This was the approach adopted in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 
(4) SA 1319 (SCA) in an action by a widow married to the deceased breadwinner in terms of Islamic 
law where the marriage was not registered as a civil marriage in terms of the Marriage Act 25 of 
1961.
114 Act 99 of 1998 which expressly provides that the Act will apply in respect of the legal duty of any 
person to maintain any other person ‘irrespective of the nature of the relationship between those 
persons giving rise to that duty’ 
115 (Fn 109 above) 334
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ily benefits to same-sex couples will be given only in circumstances where 
those couples have conducted themselves in ways that replicate the qualities 
of heterosexual marriage. From the Home Affairs judgment to the Du Ples-
sis case, references have been made to the consortium omnis vitae resulting 
from common law marriage, thus suggesting that we can only consider the 
regulation of same-sex relationships when the requirements of different-sex 
relationships are in evidence. 
It follows that marriage remains the focal point for the protection and regu-
lation of same-sex relationships. It is arguable that the most important legal, 
social and jurisprudential development that gays and lesbians could achieve 
is that of the right to marry. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that what fol-
lowed was a revolution of sorts in the form of a demand for the right to same-
sex marriage as a means of celebrating their unions.
4   FOURIE AND SAME­SEX MARRIAGE (SITE OF 
CELEBRATION)
The arguments for and against making marriage a priority for lesbians and 
gays have been presented extensively. For years, a debate has raged on 
whether admission to marriage will enhance the ‘real’ equality of lesbians 
and gay men.118 Andrew Sullivan in his reader on same-sex marriage correctly 
identifies the difficulties that this debate raises:
‘Marriage is alternately praised and derided as a lynchpin of procreation, love, power, 
economics, convenience, morality, civil rights. Homosexuality similarly evokes opposing 
judgments: it is seen as a perversion; a source of identity, love and desire, a freely chosen 
lifestyle, a fabricated personality, a revolution against the status quo. And when these two 
contested areas are brought together, this matrix of interpretation is multiplied even more, 
so that, at times, it may seem as if no one is even speaking about the same thing.’119 
Despite this confusion of interpretation, it is nevertheless difficult to argue 
against the basic principle so eloquently articulated by many: that lesbian 
and gay couples deserve the same rights as heterosexual couples. The main 
reasons why same-sex couples would want to pursue a right to marry would 
be: (1) to receive the same benefits exclusively bestowed upon married cou-
ples (for example, access to rights, such as inheritance, social security ben-
efits, health insurance and tax advantages); and (2) for the social accept-
ance and acknowledgement of their humanity that would be accorded their 
relationships through marriage. In Stoddard’s estimation, ‘marriage is … the 
issue most likely to lead ultimately to a world free from discrimination against 
118 See, generally, Eskridge WN ‘A history of same-sex marriage’ (1993) 79 Virginia Law Review 1419; 
Polikoff ND ‘We will get what we ask for: Why legalising gay and lesbian marriage will not “disman-
tle the legal structure of gender in every marriage”’. (1993) 79 Virginia Law Review 1535; Stoddard 
TB ‘Why gay people should seek the right to marry’ in Sherman S (ed), Lesbian and gay marriage 
(Philadelphia, 1992); Lind C ‘Sexuality and same-sex relationships in law’ in Brooks-Gordon B et al 
(eds), Sexuality repositioned–diversty and the law 2004 109; De Vos P ‘Same-sex sexual desire and 
the re-imagining of the South African family’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 179; Pantazis A ‘An argument for the 
legal recognition of gay and lesbian marriage’ (1997) 114 SALJ 556; Williams K ‘‘I do” or “we wont”: 
Legalising same-sex marriage in South Africa’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 32. 
119 Quoted in Williams K ibid 33
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lesbians and gay men’.120 Without doubt, marriage is a profoundly symbolic 
institution, representing state celebration of particular (heterosexual) rela-
tionships. The opening up of the institution of marriage to gays and lesbians 
would be a form of legal celebration of homosexuality and an indication that 
gays and lesbians are closer to a position of real legal equality. For the state 
to be involved in celebration means that what is celebrated is not just ac-
ceptable but is in fact good. Celebration, in the present context, means that 
society not only accepts or condones this group but approves of it. Finally, 
it will be a logical culmination of the court’s developing sexual orientation 
jurisprudence. 
As a step towards, satisfying these objectives, many lesbian and gay cou-
ples had in fact ‘married’, either informally before friends and family to gather 
as witnesses to the exchange of vows, or traditionally in churches and homes 
without waiting for society’s or the law’s sanction. One such couple was Marie 
Fourie and her partner, Cecilia Bonthuys.
In 2002, the Department of Home Affairs declined to recognise their ‘mar-
riage’. The couple lost a Pretoria High Court bid for a review of this decision 
in October 2002.121 They sought leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court 
which was refused owing to their failure to mount a challenge to the consti-
tutionality of section 30(1) of the Marriage Act.122 They were instead referred 
to the Supreme Court of Appeal,123 where the crisp question to be dealt with 
was whether two adults of the same-sex who loved each other and who had 
deliberately expressed an exclusive commitment to one another for life ought 
to be allowed to marry. The court reiterated prior decisions articulating doc-
trines of dignity, equality and inclusive moral citizenship and held that to 
deny gays and lesbians access to a conjugal relationship would inflict a deep 
and scarring hardship on a very real segment of the community for no ra-
tional reason.124 The majority in the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the 
right of same-sex couples to celebrate a secular marriage would have to await 
a challenge to the Marriage Act; in the meanwhile the common law definition 
of marriage125 should be developed so as to embrace same-sex couples. Mar-
riage, in their view, ought to be defined as a voluntary union of two persons to 
the exclusion of all others while it lasts. The minority judgment held both that 
the common law should be developed and that the Marriage Act could and 
should be read there and then in an updated form so as to permit same-sex 
120 Stoddard (fn 116 above) 17
121  In the High Court, Roux J turned down their application to have their ‘marriage’ legalised and regis-
tered and ruled that they were, in fact, not married. In dismissing the case, the judge announced that 
the validity of South African marriage laws is a constitutional question on which he would refrain 
from exercising his own discretion. He was aware of nothing which had changed the heterosexual 
understanding of marriage, meaning that the couple were not legally married.
122 This section provides that marriage officers must put to each of the parties the following question: 
‘Do you AB … call all here present to witness that you take CD as your lawful wife (or husband)?’ 
(Emphasis added).
123 Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs 2005 (3) SA 429 (SCA). In this court, the appellants pursued their 
application made in the High Court i.e. that the common law should be developed but once again 
they failed to link this with a challenge to the Marriage Act.
124 Ibid para 19 
125 See text to (fn 23 above).
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couples to pronounce the vows. It held further, however, that the develop-
ment of the common law to bring it in line with the Constitution should be 
suspended to enable parliament to enact appropriate legislation. Both par-
ties, being unhappy with the outcome of the decision, lodged appeals to the 
Constitutional Court. 
In the Constitutional Court,126 the state contended that the failure to pro-
vide legal recognition to the unions of same-sex couples was not the fault 
of the Marriage Act but rather flowed from the failure of the law to provide 
an adequate and independent means of legal recognition apart from the Act 
itself. Sachs J replied that the law, as an abstraction, was not to blame, but 
those instruments which flowed from it and excluded protection to those in-
dividuals entitled to it. Sachs J treated the issue in this case as a logical step 
after a series of rulings by the court striking down various forms of unequal 
treatment of gays and lesbians. Despite such progress, however, he added 
that the default position of gays and lesbians is still one of exclusion and 
marginalisation. In the course of his judgment, he addressed each of the is-
sues usually raised against same-sex marriage127 and provided thoughtful 
and well-reasoned responses to them. In particular, he pointed out that an 
acknowledgement by the state of the right of same-sex couples to enjoy the 
same status, entitlements and responsibilities as heterosexual couples was 
in no way inconsistent with the rights of religious organisations to continue 
to refuse to celebrate same-sex marriages. Marriage officers, he said, could 
refuse to marry a same-sex couple if it went against their conscience. He em-
phasised that the court cannot allow religious disapproval to affect how the 
government deals with its citizens128. Once again, the state’s resistance to the 
public recognition of same-sex rights becomes evident in its attempt to block 
the recognition of same-sex unions as marriages. In this regard, I agree with 
Woolman129 that the same-sex jurisprudence, even though truly transforma-
tive, represented a challenge to the status quo.
The court was unanimous in finding that both the common law definition of 
marriage and s 30(1) of the Marriage Act was unconstitutional to the extent 
that the common law does not permit same-sex couples to enjoy the same 
status, benefits and responsibilities accorded to heterosexual couples, and 
section 30(1) omits the words ‘or spouse’ after the words ‘or husband’ in the 
126 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie and Others 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC). The court was actually ruling 
on two different cases joined for decision. One, brought by Fourie and her partner, Bonthuys, chal-
lenging the common law definition of marriage; and the other case, brought by the Lesbian and Gay 
Equality Project in the Johannesburg High Court, which had not yet proceeded to trial, but advanced 
the more ambitious claim that the Marriage Act itself was unconstitutional for excluding same-sex 
couples. The Constitutional Court granted an extraordinary petition to consider these two cases 
together.
127 They are: (1) the procreation argument; (2) religious arguments; (3) the international law argument; 
and (4) family law pluralism argument.
128 It is perhaps worthy to note this, especially in the light of the widespread protests after the judgment 
by many religious and cultural organisations against the recognition of gay and lesbian marriages. 
They argued that the recognition of gay and lesbian marriages was fundamentally at odds with the 
religious beliefs of the overwhelming majority of South Africans and in many instances expressly 
forbidden in religious texts. 
129 See (Fn 116 above).
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Act.130 Although the court was unanimous in the order, it was not unanimous 
as to the remedy. Writing for all but one member of the court, Sachs J held 
that the best remedy to the unconstitutional exclusion of gay and lesbian 
couples from the institution of marriage would be to suspend the declara-
tions of invalidity for 12 months from the date of the judgment in order to 
allow parliament time to adopt appropriate legislation. He made clear that if 
parliament failed to act, the court’s ruling would automatically go into effect, 
requiring government officials to allow same-sex couples to marry under ex-
isting law by ‘reading in’ to the Marriage Act appropriate language suggested 
by the court. One member disagreed with this approach. O’Regan J was of 
the opinion that the order of invalidity should not be suspended but that 
the court itself should rather make an immediately effective order develop-
ing the common law and read in words into section 30 of the Marriage Act 
that would with immediate effect permit gays and lesbians to be married by 
civil marriage officers. O’Regan J defended her standpoint by alluding to the 
separation of powers envisaged by the Constitution, adding that this doctrine 
‘cannot … be used to avoid the obligation of a court to provide appropriate 
relief … to litigants who successfully raise a constitutional complaint’.131
The decision in Fourie hardly comes as a surprise. In fact, one can describe 
it as the logical culmination of a long judicial process which began with the 
landmark National Coalition cases (both the Sodomy and the Home Affairs 
decisions) which set the tone for rectifying discrimination against gays and 
lesbians. Most legal scholars will probably not argue with the conclusion ar-
rived at by the court. The judgment, however, raises complex issues around 
the definition of marriage and yet the most conspicuous omission from the 
judgment is the absence of the words ‘right to marry’ or ‘right to the institu-
tion of marriage’ in the context of same-sex couples. Furthermore, in framing 
the issue, Sachs J identifies that one of the questions asked of the court was 
whether or not the failure by the common law and Marriage Act to provide for 
means whereby same-sex couples can marry, constitutes unfair discrimina-
tion.132 Nowhere in his judgment does he directly answer this specific ques-
tion in the affirmative. Instead, the repetitive theme in the judgment is that 
the violation of the right to equality manifests itself in denying same-sex cou-
ples the benefits, entitlements and responsibilities (my emphasis) afforded to 
heterosexual couples via marriage. The judgment, in effect, affords same-sex 
couples all of the rights of the institution of marriage, but it does not grant 
them the right to the institution itself.133 From this perspective the decision in 
Fourie appears to be problematic.
Furthermore, the court placed much reliance on its previous decisions start-
130 See (fn 120 above).
131 (Fn 124 above) para 170
132 Ibid para 45, emphasis added
133 See paras 71, 72, 75 and 114. Sachs J stipulates (in para 72) that ‘if heterosexual couples have the 
option of deciding whether to marry or not, so should same-sex couples have the choice as whether 
to seek to achieve a status and a set of entitlements and responsibilities on a par with those enjoyed by 
heterosexual couples’. There is no mention of any right to embrace these entitlements in a same-sex 
institution referred to as a ‘marriage’.
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ing from the Home Affairs case where it held that gays and lesbians are as ca-
pable as heterosexuals of forming a consortium omnis vitae, the denominator 
in terms of which the marriage relationship is described. It has been argued 
that the equalisation by the court of heterosexual and homosexual relation-
ships without explaining how it equates these concepts certainly reflects a 
very mechanical view of the marriage relationship.134 The previous decisions 
dealt with pension and other benefits, sexual expression and residency rights 
and not with the unique nature of the marriage relationship. In fact, Fourie is 
the first decision to deal with rights to marriage as an institution in the context 
of same-sex couples. 
The most problematic aspect of the judgment, though, was the remedy. The 
court, with respect, ought to have been far more sensitive to the fact that the 
claim by the applicants of the right to get married and celebrate their union 
demanded far more than a suspended declaration of invalidity. Moreover, 
the court in the earlier cases exercised its extensive powers in reading in to 
statutes to cure the unconstitutionality of provisions. The same could have 
been applied in this case. If the court, as it did, had the power to read in to 
statutes, then surely it must have the power to read in to the common law. 
After all, common law is judge-made law. In this respect, the dissent on the 
order by O’Regan J is to be preferred because it provided an immediate rem-
edy and left no room for uncertainty for those same-sex couples who enter 
into marriages. 
Guided by the outcome, parliament tabled the Civil Union Bill, which made 
provision for civil unions between same-sex partners. In terms of section 13 of 
the Bill, the same legal consequences of marriage would apply, with such chang-
es as may be required by the context, to a civil partnership. Marriage in any 
other law including the common law but excluding the Marriage Act, will also be 
read as referring to a civil partnership.135 The civil partnership proposed by the 
Bill has been the subject of much controversy since its introduction. De Vos136 
submitted that although the Bill purported to give effect to the decision of the 
Constitutional Court ordering an extension of marriage to same-sex couples, it 
in effect denied them that right. The Bill created a separate institution for same-
sex couples which differed from traditional marriage in at least three ways: it 
would not be called a marriage; marriage officers would have the right to refuse 
to solemnise it; and it would only be open to same-sex couples.137 He went on 
to say that the creation of a ‘separate but equal’ marriage regime not only failed 
to respect the dignity of gay men and lesbians, it contradicted the instructions of 
the Constitutional Court. The State Law Advisor at the time declined to certify 
the Bill adding that it did not fully implement the guiding principles as set out by 
the Constitutional Court.138 
134 Robinson JA ‘The evolution of the concept of marriage in South Africa: The influence of the Bill of 
Rights in 1994’ 2005 Vol 26 (3) Obiter 488502
135 S 13(2)(a)
136 ‘Gays and lesbians now ‘separate but equal’ Mail and Guardian 15 to 21 September (2006) 35
137 Ibid.
138 ‘Concern about Civil Union Bill’, 8 September (2006) Daily News, 8
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The complaint was that the Bill itself was subject to constitutional attack 
because it failed to amend section 30(1) of the Marriage Act to include same-
sex couples within its ambit. Moreover, this move by parliament was consid-
ered a huge step backward when examined against the advances made in the 
earlier cases. 
In an effort to address some of the complaints, Parliament, just two months 
later, passed the Civil Union Act139 which came into operation on the 30 
November 2006. This Act provides for the solemnisation and registration of 
civil unions, by way of either a marriage or civil partnership, between two per-
sons. The parties have the choice to elect whether their civil union should be 
known as a marriage (in which case the one is declared ‘a lawful spouse’ of 
the other) or a civil partnership (whereby the one is declared a ‘civil partner’ 
of the other).140 As in the original Bill, a marriage officer may still object on the 
ground of conscience, religion and belief to solemnising a civil union between 
persons of the same sex. Section 13 provides as follows: 
‘13(1)  The legal consequences of a marriage contemplated in the Marriage Act apply, 
with such changes as may be required by the context, to a civil union.
13 (2)  With the exception of the Marriage Act and the Customary Marriages Act, any refer-
ence to-
 (a)  marriage in any other law, including the common law, includes a civil union 
... and
 (b)  husband, wife or spouse in any other law, including the common law, in-
clude a civil union partner.’
The passing of the Civil Union Act is to be welcomed in general in that it gives 
effect to the features highlighted by Sachs J in Fourie (see below), namely, 
that different family forms should be recognised and protected. Even though 
parties to a civil union can choose to call their union a marriage, section 
13(2) of the Act raises many questions. The first asks: Why was the Marriage 
Act retained and not repealed in its entirety? The second question asks: Why 
has marriage rights for same-sex couples been regulated in a separate piece 
of legislation? It is possible that government, in passing this Act, aimed to 
achieve some kind of a compromise to allay the concerns of the more con-
servative element of society who are opposed to same-sex marriages.141 It 
would appear that the Act is nothing more than an attempt to pacify, not only 
the conservatives, but also the gay and lesbian movement by affording them 
the option of calling their union a marriage should they so wish. A compro-
mised solution, in the author’s submission, falls short of true celebration and 
hence, full equality. 
139 Act 17 of 2006
140 Ibid s 11(1)
141 As in the draft Bill, section 6 of the Act confirms that marriage officers are free to refuse to perform 
marriages that are not in accordance with their religious beliefs.
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5  CONCLUSION
In the pre-democratic era, not only were individual gays and lesbians de-
nied any protection, but their relationships were neither acknowledged nor 
respected. Criminalisation of same-sex conduct was perhaps the best exam-
ple of condemnation towards gays and lesbians during this time. The post-
apartheid constitution, in contrast, began with the legal protection of ‘sexual 
orientation’ as a form of identity. In the great movement towards gay and 
lesbian equality, the early battles be it decriminalisation142, or protection from 
discrimination143 concerned matters that involved individual rights. There-
after, a new generation of disputes emerged which concerned relationships 
rather than individuals and now, with the passing of the Civil Union Act, a 
new distinct status has been conferred upon gays and lesbians.
Sachs J wrote in Fourie144 that the Constitutional Court, in five consecutive 
decisions (Home Affairs, Satchwell, Du Toit, J and Du Plessis) highlighted at 
least four features of the context in which the prohibition against unfair dis-
crimination on grounds of sexual orientation must be analysed. They are: 
‘(1) South Africa has a multitude of family formations that are evolving rapidly as our 
society develops, so that it is inappropriate to entrench any particular form as the only 
socially and legally acceptable one; (2) The existence of an imperative constitutional 
need to acknowledge the long history in our country of marginalisation and persecution 
of gays and lesbians; (3) Although a number of breakthroughs have been made in par-
ticular areas, there is no comprehensive legal regulation of the family law rights of gays 
and lesbians; and (4) Our Constitution represents a radical rupture with a past based 
on intolerance and exclusion, and the movement forward to the acceptance of the need 
to develop a society based on equality and respect across difference. Small gestures in 
favour of equality, however meaningful, are not enough. At the very least, equality affirms 
that difference should not be the basis for exclusion and stigma. At best, it celebrates the 
vitality that difference brings to any society.’ 
Indeed, these judgments have demonstrated the growing concern for, under-
standing of, and sensitivity towards human diversity in general and to gays 
and lesbians and their relationships in particular. To that extent, they repre-
sent an attitude of compassion and condonation to same-sex identity. 
The real difficulty, in my view, is presented at the site of celebration. There 
is an urgent need for a reassessment of all life partnerships145 in order to ad-
dress the many rules constructed around marriage. The existence of separate 
legislation to accommodate same-sex marriages is no different to the ‘sepa-
rate but equal’ principle noted by De Vos.146 The celebration of homosexual-
ity and lesbianism by allowing them to celebrate in the institution of marriage 
does not end the discourse about gay and lesbian rights. It is arguable that 
legal rights and legal discourse is only a limited aspect of the social reality 
142 The Sodomy judgment (Fn 57 above)
143 Langemaat (fn 72 above)
144 (Fn 124 above) at para 59
145 This article has focused on same-sex unions, which constitute only one type of life partnership. 
Opposite-sex life partnerships and polygynous unions, both of which are characterised by a consor-
tium, have also been the subject of much debate in recent years. 
146 See (fn 133 above).
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for gays and lesbians, even though it is a significant aspect.147 Legal victories 
are thus critical in reinforcing identity, but these victories do not immediately 
and simultaneously eradicate the persistent threat of homophobia.148 That is 
still a battle to overcome.  
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